A basic issue in social influence is how best to change one's judgment in response to learning the opinions of others. This article examines the strategies that people use to revise their quantitative estimates on the basis of the estimates of another person. The authors note that people tend to use 2 basic strategies when revising estimates: choosing between the 2 estimates and averaging them. The authors developed the probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model to examine the relative effectiveness of these two strategies across judgment environments. A surprising result was that averaging was the more effective strategy across a wide range of commonly encountered environments. The authors observed that despite this finding, people tend to favor the choosing strategy. Most participants in these studies would have achieved greater accuracy had they always averaged. The identification of intuitive strategies, along with a formal analysis of when they are accurate, provides a basis for examining how effectively people use the judgments of others. Although a portfolio of strategies that includes averaging and choosing can be highly effective, the authors argue that people are not generally well adapted to the environment in terms of strategy selection.
A basic tenet of social psychology is that people look to others to resolve uncertainty in their judgments (Festinger, 1954) . Research in social psychology has painted two pictures of the consequences of this process. The dominant image has been one of people yielding to others too readily (Asch, 1952) . This image comes from the large body of work on normative influence in which judgments were given publicly and the judgments of others were deliberately designed to be inaccurate. In these cases, people often conformed to the inaccurate judgments of others to avoid rejection. People listened to others but should not have. A second image-frequently proposed but less explored-is that judgments can become more accurate under the influence of others (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) . The fact that influence could lead to improved accuracy received little theoretical or empirical attention in the classic research on conformity (see reviews by Allen, 1965; Campbell, 1961; Tajfel, 1969) . The dominant view in this era was that social influence was harmful to the individual. Eventually, however, the view that dissenters should steadfastly withstand group influence was critiqued by research in evolutionary psychology, anthropology, and economics showing that conformity can be adaptive (Kameda & Tindale, 2006) . More specifically, aggregation strategies that listen equally to multiple individuals, such as majority rule (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Sorkin, West, & Robinson, 1998) and averaging (Hogarth, 1978) , often outperform strategies that rely on lone opinions.
A basic decision in social life, therefore, is whether to listen to others or to ignore them. Theoretically, individual judgment can be improved by listening to others in the right circumstances. But what happens in practice? Do people actually receive the full benefit of others' wisdom? Past work does not yield a clear answer. Research on conformity showed that people who are initially correct often succumb to social pressure and adopt an incorrect answer, but this conclusion was derived in deliberately misleading environments (Tajfel, 1969) . Subsequent research showed that aggregating opinions in realistic environments often outperforms relying on a single opinion (see review by Clemen, 1989 ). An important question lies at the unexplored intersection of these traditions: Do people use the most appropriate strategies to revise their judgments in realistic environments? This is a fundamental but unanswered question in the literature on social influence (Tajfel, 1969) .
This question echoes a more general one in cognitive psychology: Do people use effective cognitive strategies across different environments? Beginning with Simon (1955) , researchers have suggested that people rely on a repertoire of strategies that are suboptimal from a normative point of view but that perform well within the biologically imposed constraints on information processing. These strategies have the potential to perform well under a wide range of ecologically plausible conditions (Gigerenzer, 2000; Simon, 1956; Toda, 1962) , but their degree of accuracy is contingent on a variety of task and context variables (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988) . A critical question in this literature is the question of adaptability: Do people use the right strategy at the right time (McKenzie, 2005; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) ? We consider in this article the most elementary of social influence tasks, specifically, revising a private quantitative judgment, in which a person forms an initial private judgment, learns the judgment of another person, and then provides a final private judgment. Research on combining opinions has concluded that people weight judgments according to a source's credibility, accuracy, confidence, and access to information (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; Birnbaum, Wong, & Wong, 1976; Budescu, Rantilla, Yu, & Karelitz, 2003; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995) . Studies of advice taking have concluded that people tend to favor their own judgments in the weighting process (see review by Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006) . When estimating quantities, participants adjust, on average, about 30% of the distance between their initial estimate and advice (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Lim & O'Connor, 1995; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) . Various explanations have been offered for this particular level of opinion change, including anchoring (Lim & O'Connor, 1995) , privileged access to one's own reasons (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) , and social norms against ignoring advice (Harvey & Fischer, 1997) .
We believe that past research has largely overlooked another possibility. Suppose that a judge alternates between ignoring and fully adopting advice at a 7:3 ratio. On some items the judge chooses to keep her own estimate, and on other items she goes with the advisor's estimate. The mean adjustment is 30%, but clearly this is not a typical response in this example. The example illustrates how a mean of 30% can arise from different response distributions. Understanding the distribution that underlies the mean weight is important for two reasons. First, a cognitive process in which one alternates between estimates is very different from consistently adjusting 30% of the way toward advice. Second, different distributions of weights have different implications for accuracy. For example, consistently taking the simple average of opinions is a powerful way to improve accuracy because it has the tendency to cancel out errors on either side of the truth (Clemen, 1989; Clemen & Winkler, 1986; Surowiecki, 2004) . Consistently adjusting 30% of the way toward advice is likely to approach the performance of the simple average on account of a mathematical result known as the flat maximum principle (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986) . Alternating between estimates will achieve none of the benefits of aggregation, and thus will typically lead to lower accuracy as compared with averaging. We discuss these points more thoroughly later in the article.
In this light, it is notable that Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000, Study 1) reported a median adjustment of 2% in addition to a mean adjustment of 29%, suggesting that on many items participants chose to stay with their initial answers. Particularly noteworthy is a study by Lees and Triggs (1997) . These authors initially intended to replicate an influential study by Birnbaum (1976) , who had concluded that people average when faced with a two-cue prediction task. Lees and Triggs (1997) plotted the histogram of weights and found that the distribution was often bimodal; their participants were choosing between cues rather than averaging them. In fact, the pattern of means was a perfect replication of Birnbaum (1976) . It was only the item-level analysis that revealed that the process was not averaging. There are undoubtedly many cognitive tasks that are appropriately modeled as a weighted average of multiple cues. However, the task of revising quantity estimates appears to be one in which people might be choosing more often than researchers have previously recognized.
Very little research has reported analyses fine grained enough to show whether people are truly combining on individual items. Many published studies involve statistical aggregation across items and therefore cannot conclusively discriminate among candidate processes (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Hutchinson, Kamakura, & Lynch, 2000) . The choice literature has made more progress in this regard, using process-tracing techniques to show that people process either by attribute or by alternative as a function of task and context variables . When required effort is high, for example, people may compare alternatives on only one attribute (Payne et al., 1988 )-a choosing strategy. To anticipate some of our results, in revising quantitative opinions, we find that people do often choose. Adjusting 30% of the way toward advice turns out to be a relatively rare response in our data. Most of the time participants either choose between estimates or average them. Although we replicate the mean 30% level of adjustment, this aggregate result turns out to be atypical at the item level.
The focus of this article is thus on two strategies: choosing and averaging. These two judgmental strategies have been studied extensively by cognitive psychologists in other tasks. For example, choosing corresponds to the take-the-best heuristic proposed by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) , and averaging is analogous to the unit weighting of informational cues (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975) . Each strategy performs well under different conditions, and past research on judgmental strategies has highlighted three important issues with respect to their performance. First, a given strategy will vary in its effectiveness across environments. In comparison with normative rules, simple strategies are easy to apply, can save substantial effort, and can be highly accurate in the right situation. However, in other, less favorable situations, the same simple strategy can lead to inaccurate judgments or poor decisions (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; McKenzie, 1994; Payne et al., 1988; Russo & Dosher, 1983; Thorngate, 1980) . Second, people may or may not actually use the strategies under study. Researchers have been drawn to fast and simple strategies that appear to work well in some contexts (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999) . However, just because a given strategy requires little cognitive effort and is effective does not imply that people use it, although it is a clue that they might (Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa, & Redington, 2003) . Third, although people might possess a portfolio of strategies that are effective contingent on the environment, this does not imply that they are well adapted. Adaptability requires that people apply the right strategy at the right time (McKenzie, 2005; Payne et al., 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) . This article addresses all three issues for the task of revising quantity estimates. We begin with a discussion of the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of both averaging and choosing. We then develop the PAR model, which serves as the framework for our argument that people would perform better if they averaged more often. The model delineates the environmental conditions under which each strategy-averaging or choosing-performs better. The name of the model derives from its components-the probability of identifying the more accurate judge, the relative accuracy of the judges, and the redundancy of opinions. The last term captures the extent to which judges have similar perspectives that lead to similar errors. The more similar the errors, the less likely averaging is to cancel them out. The general implications of the PAR model are fairly straightforward: Averaging is more attractive as a strategy to the extent that better judges are not easily identified, differences in accuracy are not too large, and errors are nonredundant. The surprising element is that averaging is remarkably robust, holding up well even when there are large differences in accuracy. After developing the model, we present four experiments showing that people primarily choose and average. The experiments also explore factors that might lead people to apply a given strategy in a given situation. Finally, we address the question of whether people's strategy selection is appropriate to the environment. The evidence suggests that although the choosing strategy is sometimes appropriate, people tend to overuse it and could improve performance by averaging more often.
The Performance of Strategies
Although researchers now take for granted that aggregation reduces error and improves reliability, the appreciation of averaging is a relatively recent development in the history of science. Consider a dilemma once faced by the great mathematician Leonhard Euler. In solving a particularly difficult problem he had to decide whether to average the terms of separate equations together in order to make the problem tractable. Euler decided not to average because he feared that "the errors of the observations and of the calculations can multiply themselves" (Euler, 1749, as quoted by Stigler, 1986, p. 29) . In rejecting averaging, Euler failed to adequately answer one of his generation's major questions about astronomy (Stigler, 1986) . Although it may now seem like an obvious flaw in statistical reasoning, Euler was merely following the custom of the day. Astronomers and chemists of the early 1700s typically chose the individual measurements that they believed to be of the best quality and discarded the rest (Gigerenzer et al., 1989; Stigler, 1999) . The second half of the century brought new insights into statistical aggregation, and the method of least squares (which essentially derives a model by averaging out errors across observations) was eventually published by Legendre in 1805 (Stigler, 1986) .
In recent times, the effectiveness of averaging has been demonstrated in fields as diverse as psychiatry (Goldberg, 1965) , meteorology (Staël von Holstein, 1971) , economics (Clemen & Winkler, 1986; Graham, 1996) , and group decision making (Hastie, 1986; Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958; Zajonc, 1962) . Averaging typically improves performance for judgments of both quantity (Armstrong, 2001; Clemen, 1989 ) and probability (Ariely et al., 2000; Johnson, Budescu, & Wallsten, 2001 ) and compares favorably with more complex statistical methods of aggregation (Clemen, 1989; Makridakis & Hibon, 2000; Makridakis & Winkler, 1983) . In a compelling demonstration, Armstrong (2001) reanalyzed 30 studies conducted between 1960 and 2000, which varied substantially in topic, forecasting methods, time horizon, number of forecasts combined, and method for evaluating accuracy (e.g., mean absolute deviation, root mean squared error, Brier score). Across the studies, averaging led to a reduction in error in the range of 3.4% to 23.5% relative to the mean accuracy of the individual components, with a mean reduction of 12.5%.
Although modern scientists often average as a matter of routine, laypeople typically have poor intuitions for the power of combining. People tend to believe that averaging estimates will lead to an average level of accuracy . They are also skeptical of averaging across sources that are susceptible to both bias and random noise (Soll, 1999) . Given the common confusion about averaging, it is worth devoting some space to discussing the logic behind why it works. In this discussion, we also seek to clarify the conditions under which choosing is the more appropriate strategy. We then develop the PAR model, which shows mathematically which strategy works well when.
Averaging
Why does averaging work so well? Consider what happens with estimates from two judges. There are two possible configurations of the estimates. First, both estimates may lie on the same side of the truth. Suppose that two faculty are estimating the number of doctoral program applications they will receive this year. Their estimates are 70 and 80, and the correct answer is 90. The judges miss the truth by 20 and 10, respectively, so their mean discrepancy is 15. Averaging their initial estimates gives an answer of 75, which also misses the correct response by 15. In general, when estimates are on the same side of the truth, the discrepancy between the average estimate and the truth equals the mean discrepancy of the individual estimates. Next consider estimates that bracket the truth, such as 70 and 100. The mean individual miss is still 15, but the average estimate of 85 misses by just 5. When estimates bracket, the discrepancy between the average and the truth must be less than the mean discrepancy of the individual estimates. Putting the two possibilities together, averaging is at least as accurate as the average accuracy of the individual estimates and is more accurate in the case of bracketing.
1 The result also holds when accuracy scores are aggregated across items . That is, the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of averaging is at least as low as the average MAD of the judges.
To illustrate how different combination strategies affect accuracy, we consider a simple example of a judge and an advisor, equally accurate, whose forecast errors follow a standard normal distribution. The judge forms an initial estimate j, obtains advice a, and then revises to r. We measure the influence of the judge's initial opinion as "weight on the self" (ws), where r ϭ ws ϫ j ϩ (1 -ws) ϫ a. Rearranging terms, we obtain ws ϭ (r Ϫ a)/(j Ϫ a). For example, choosing oneself corresponds to ws ϭ 1; adjusting 30% toward advice, ws ϭ .7; averaging, ws ϭ .5; and choosing the advisor, ws ϭ 0. Figure 1 plots MAD against ws for three rates of bracketing (operationalized by varying correlation in random error), assuming that judge and advisor are equally accurate. The figure shows that even small adjustments away from extreme weighting lead to substantial improvement. Just moving 10% 1 Although we use absolute deviation as the measure of performance, the result holds for any convex penalty function, such as squared error, on account of Jensen's inequality. For related discussion, see Dawes (1970 Dawes ( , 1979 ; Hogarth (1978) ; Tetlock (2005, p. 179), and Winkler (1971). toward advice yields approximately one third of the total benefits of averaging in the case of 50% bracketing. Notice also that MAD is relatively insensitive to moderate deviations from .5. This flat maximum result (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986 ) is even more dramatic at lower rates of bracketing. The convexity of the curve has another implication, which is that applying the same weight consistently outperforms alternating to achieve the same average weight. For example, a consistent weight of .5 is clearly better than alternating evenly between 0 and 1. Also, a consistent weight of .75 outperforms alternating between .5 and 1. These results follow from the well-known Jensen's inequality.
Averaging is clearly the optimal strategy when judges are equally accurate, and moderate deviations from averaging are relatively inconsequential. The reverse is also true; equal-weight averaging often performs well when it is not optimal (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975) . There are two basic reasons for this. First, on account of the flat maximum result, averaging will come close to optimal performance as long as the optimal weights are not too extreme. Second, there is an important distinction between optimal weights and estimated optimal weights. By definition, averaging will underperform optimal weights (except when averaging happens to be optimal). However, regression estimates of the optimal weights based on past data can deviate substantially from the true optimal weights when samples are small, when the process that generates forecast errors is unstable, or when sources are highly correlated (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975; Winkler, 1984) . For these reasons, many authors agree that, prescriptively, equal-weight averaging is a sound strategy in many circumstances (e.g., Armstrong, 2001; Clemen, 1989; Goodwin & Wright, 1998) .
The Case for Choosing
Given the robustness of averaging, what is the reason to ever choose a single opinion? Gigerenzer and his colleagues have argued for a judgmental strategy called "take-the-best" (TTB) for the task of selecting the correct answer from two alternatives (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007) . The TTB strategy involves relying on the single most valid cue to decide. If the best cue fails to discriminate, TTB proceeds through the hierarchy of cues, ordered according to validity, until it finds one that does. The choosing strategy is analogous to TTB-the decision maker chooses the opinion of one judge and ignores the opinions of others.
In comparison with an equal weighting of cues, TTB performs well in noncompensatory environments-ones in which the validity of the best cue is so extreme that it cannot be outvoted, even if all other cues agree on a different answer (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006 . TTB is less effective in compensatory environments. In their research program on the Adaptive Decision Maker (Payne, 1976; Payne et al., 1988 Payne et al., , 1993 , John Payne and his colleagues have extensively analyzed how decision strategies interact with environmental structure. In that work, the attributes of the alternatives are the cues, and the attribute weights correspond to the validity or importance of the attributes in predicting utility. Lexicographic strategies such as TTB perform well when the dispersion in cue validities is high (Payne et al., 1988) or when cues are highly correlated (Bettman, Johnson, Luce, & Payne, 1993) .
Just as the dispersion of cue validities plays a role in determining the relative effectiveness of choice strategies, the dispersion in expertise among judges (i.e., differences in accuracy) is important in determining the effectiveness of strategies for opinion revision. As compared with choosing, averaging will be ineffective if judges differ greatly in their MAD scores, provided that the best judge is reliably identified. When averaging in such situations, the poor accuracy of the worst judge may offset any benefit of bracketing. When the best judge cannot be reliably identified, however, averaging may be appealing even when dispersion in expertise is high. Along these lines, the available evidence suggests that people are poor at assessing the relative accuracy of sources. They often inaccurately rank order the expertise of group members (e.g., Miner, 1984; Trotman, Yetton, & Zimmer, 1983 ; but see Henry, 1995) and the validity of cues (Newell & Shanks, 2003) . Underlying this inaccuracy is the fact that people often possess poor cues to expertise. In a group discussion, for instance, people infer expertise from loquacity, confidence, and use of reason (e.g., Littlepage, Robison, & Reddington, 1997) . Given that such cues often correlate weakly with accuracy (e.g., Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999) , a main strength of averaging is that it avoids ignoring the best source of information. In sum, averaging can be very powerful, but there are boundary conditions to its effectiveness. The present discussion calls attention to three factors that determine when choosing or averaging is the better strategy: (a) probability-choosing is more accurate if the best cue (or group member, or expert) can be identified with sufficiently high probability; (b) accuracy-choosing is more accurate if a single chosen cue is substantially more valid or accurate than the others; and (c) redundancy-choosing is more accurate to the extent that the cues tend to have similar implications, and hence make similar mistakes, across trials. These three factorsprobability, accuracy, and redundancy-form the basis of the PAR model we now develop. Accuracy and redundancy describe the environment, measuring the extent to which people are alike or different in terms of both skill level and information. Probability measures the extent to which the decision maker possesses good cues to expertise and uses them appropriately. Note also that because averaging compares favorably to estimated optimal weights, it makes sense to develop a model that compares averaging and choosing. These are the strategies that prescriptively people should use, and as we show here, they are also the strategies that people often use.
The PAR Model
The purpose of the PAR model is to describe the environmental conditions under which averaging or choosing is more effective for the case of two judges. The standard for accuracy in this analysis is MAD (mean absolute deviation).
2 To capture the difference in accuracy, we define the accuracy ratio, A, to be the ratio of the MADs (mean absolute deviations) of the individual judges, higher over lower. For example, if Judges 1 and 2 have MADs equal to 10 and 15, respectively, then A ϭ 1.5, implying that Judge 2 is 50% less accurate. Judges' errors are assumed to be normally distributed, although judges may differ in the spread, or variance, of their errors. It is this difference in variance that determines the A ratio for a given pair of judges.
The redundancy component of the model is operationalized with the bracketing rate, Br, defined as the proportion of questions for which the true answer lies strictly between the estimates of the two judges. Bracketing indicates the extent to which judges' errors are dissimilar (i.e., have opposite sign), so greater levels of bracketing indicate less redundancy. Bracketing depends on the correlation between judges' error terms-higher correlation corresponds to less bracketing. If judges are susceptible to bias, defined as a general individual tendency to err consistently in one direction, then bracketing would also depend on whether biases are shared. For example, an optimistic and a pessimistic forecaster would have opposite biases, which would tend to produce a high bracketing rate. All else being equal, more bracketing, regardless of the source, implies greater benefit from averaging.
Finally, p represents the probability of correctly identifying which judge is more accurate over the entire set of questions. This probability depends on the validity and appropriate use of the available cues to expertise. For example, people may selfservingly interpret the cues as implying that the self is more expert than the advisor. Someone who uses the cues more objectively might do a better job of predicting who is more accurate.
We leave the full mathematical presentation of the PAR model for Appendix A. The basic idea behind the model is to find combinations of the model parameters for which choosing and averaging are equally accurate. Specifically, let k be the ratio of the accuracy of averaging to the expected accuracy of choosing, k ϭ MAD averaging /E(MAD choosing ). Choosing and averaging have equal expected values when k ϭ 1. This happens when
where represents the correlation in errors (see Appendix A). The PAR model does not explicitly include . The relationship between bracketing and correlation is given by
where F (0,0) represents the cumulative density function (cdf) of the standard bivariate normal probability distribution for correlation in errors . By substituting Equation 1 into Equation 2, the model is expressed solely in terms of the bracketing rate Br, the accuracy ratio A, and the expert detection probability p.
The model is presented in two figures. In Figure 2 we assume that the better judge can be identified with certainty ( p ϭ 1). Each curve in the figure specifies the set of A and Br combinations for which k is constant. The most important curve is k ϭ 1, labeled the iso-accuracy curve because averaging and choosing are equally accurate at all points on this curve. Averaging outperforms choosing above the curve and underperforms choosing below it. The curve slopes upward because higher accuracy ratios favor choosing, so the bracketing rate must be increased so that the two strategies perform equally well. Note that the form of Equation 1 changes if judges are biased, although the impact on our conclusions is very slight (see Appendix B).
2 Both MAD and squared error have been widely used as measures of accuracy (Gigone & Hastie, 1997) . We have adopted MAD as the measure of accuracy for two reasons. First, MAD is a neutral measure in the sense that it treats all errors the same. Squared error heavily penalizes large errors and hence favors averaging. We wanted to show that averaging is robust even without this advantage. Second, although squared error was favored historically, researchers in forecasting now recommend using measures based on absolute or percentage error (e.g., Hyndman & Koehler, 2006; Makridakis, 1993) . This is because measures based on squared error (e.g., root mean square error) have been shown to be less reliable and overly sensitive to outliers as compared with other measures (Armstrong & Collopy, 1992) . We also note that every loss function gives the incentive to report some measure of central tendency from a subjective probability function. Whereas squared error provides incentive to report the mean of a distribution, the incentive with MAD is to report the median (Winkler, 2003) .
A surprising result in Figure 2 is that averaging may still be superior even when differences in accuracy are relatively large. For example, averaging is better if one judge is 50% less accurate than the other (A ϭ 1.5) provided that the bracketing rate is at least 42%, which is quite plausible in empirical data. The performance of averaging is even better when the probability of detecting the more expert judge is less than 1, as shown in Figure 3 . For example, if p ϭ .8, then averaging is the better strategy even if one judge is twice as inaccurate as the other (A ϭ 2.0), assuming a moderately high but plausible level of bracketing (40 -50%).
Empirical Studies of Opinion Revision
Averaging and choosing are highly effective strategies in the appropriate environments. But do people actually use these strategies, and do they do so at the appropriate time? We conducted four experiments to investigate strategy use and performance. The experiments were designed to capture a wide range of environments that vary in the parameters of the PAR model: probability of identifying the expert, dispersion in expertise, and redundancy. We can thus use the model to understand when people are successful in revising their opinions (e.g., outperform averaging) and when they are not. The four experiments utilized similar methods, which facilitates comparisons across them in terms of strategy use and performance. Participants in each experiment privately formed initial quantitative opinions, received advice (i.e., see the actual judgments of another person), and reported a final private opinion. The experiments differed in the question topics, available cues to expertise, environmental parameters, and participant populations.
We had three main goals in conducting the experiments. First, we wanted to see whether past studies of opinion revision provided an accurate account of how people revise their estimates upon observing a peer's judgment. This is important because many past studies have reported only mean weights. A mean weight of .7 on the self, taken alone, might be interpreted as evidence that people anchor on themselves and adjust insufficiently. However, if that mean weight of .7 is achieved with a bimodal distribution that involves alternating between weights of .5 and 1, this would seem to rule out anchoring, at least as the process is commonly understood. Our second goal was to examine how people adapt their strategies as a function of the cues to expertise. We included a control condition in each experiment in which participants observed fewer cues. This allowed us to test whether the use of strategies is related to the amount of information. From a normative point of view, more information should lead to more choosing, at least at the aggregate level. Another aspect of adaptation has to do with how people respond to the direction of the cues (i.e., which judge do the cues favor?). Because people tend to believe they are better than average (Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Kruger & Choosing Better
Iso-accuracy curve Figure 2 . The probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model when p ϭ 1 ( p is the probability of detecting the more accurate judge). k represents the ratio of the accuracy of averaging to the expected accuracy of choosing, k ϭ MAD averaging /E(MAD choosing ), where MAD ϭ mean absolute deviation. Figure 3. The PAR model as a function of p (the probability of detecting the more accurate judge). For a given p, averaging is more accurate above the curve and choosing is more accurate below.
Dunning, 1999), we suspect that responses to direction will be asymmetric. Specifically, given a cue that favors a certain judge, we believe that people will use more extreme weighting when that judge is the self as opposed to the advisor. As a third and final goal, we sought to determine whether people adapt their strategies to the environment. We use the framework of the PAR model to answer the question of whether people apply the right strategy at the right time.
To anticipate some of our results, we show that people do appear to alternate between choosing and averaging-intermediate weights such as .7 are relatively rare in our data. We do find an asymmetry in how people respond to cues-they tend to favor their own opinions. Finally, although we find some evidence for adaptability, notably in Experiment 4, people can improve accuracy by choosing less and averaging more.
Experiment 1

Method
Materials. The stimulus materials were developed from an annual ranking of over 100 Master of Business Administration (MBA) programs conducted by the Financial Times. Thirty American business schools were randomly chosen from the report. One of the variables provided in the report is the mean annual salary of alumni 3 years after graduation. This mean 3rd-year salary served as the criterion value in the estimation task in this experiment.
Participants. Seventy-six University of Chicago MBA students participated. We wanted to ensure in this experiment that participants understood that they were observing the actual opinions of their peers. Thus, this experiment was conducted in a classroom so that answer sheets could be collected, shuffled, and anonymously redistributed to the participants.
Procedure. One week prior to the experiment, participants estimated the salaries for five randomly chosen schools in a pretest. In the experiment itself, participants first made initial estimates for the 25 remaining schools. They were told that they would have a chance to revise their answers after seeing the opinions of another participant in the room and that they would be paid for the accuracy of their final answers. The base payment would be 60¢ for each question, less 2¢ for every $1,000 by which the final estimate missed the correct answer (negative payments were possible on individual questions but not for the whole study). After completing their initial estimates for the 25 schools, participants copied those estimates onto an "advice sheet." At this point those participants in the feedback condition received their MAD score for the five-item pretest from the previous week, which they recorded on the advice sheet as well. The advice sheets were then collected and redistributed to another participant in the room, randomly and anonymously, with the constraint that participants receive "advice" from peers in the same condition. Those in the no-feedback condition went through the same procedure, except that they did not receive feedback on their own pretest performance nor on that of their peer advisor. Participants next revised their estimates, using their initial answers and those of the peer advisor as a reference. Their earnings for accuracy ranged from $5 to $10.75, with a median of $8.70.
Results
Item-level weight analysis. We first consider the distribution of weights on own and advisor's opinion. In computing ws, we had to make two decisions. First, the set of possible values for ws was occasionally limited by the difference between estimates. For example, if participants felt obliged to give estimates rounded to the nearest thousand, then estimates that were $2,000 apart would permit ws values of only 0, .5, and 1. In general, we omitted questions where the difference was less than five units on the relevant scale. In the current study, that meant differences of less than $5,000, as the vast majority of estimates were multiples of 1,000. Second, very rarely a revised estimate fell outside the range of the two initial estimates. In these cases, we truncated ws to the nearer of 0 or 1. Altogether, 14.8% of observations were omitted as a result of small differences, and an additional 4.6% were truncated for being out of range. Analyses that included the omitted questions and/or used untruncated values yielded results qualitatively similar to those reported here. For all experiments in this article, the adjustments were applied only for the analysis of weights, not for the analysis of accuracy. After making the adjustments, as outlined above, we found mean ws in Experiment 1 to be .68, similar to what has been reported in past research. The distribution of weights, however, tells a different story. Because ws is on a continuous scale, we classified each observed value of ws into one of seven weight categories, corresponding to ws ϭ 0, . 01Ϫ.19, .20 -.39, .40 -.60, .61-.79, .80 -.99 , and 1. As shown in Figure 4 , the distribution of ws is W-shaped, with modes at 0, .4 -.6, and 1. This is a point of departure from what previous research has reported. In our data, the observed mean is not a typical observation but rather arises from a combination of choosing and averaging. The three modes in the distribution accounted for 64% of the observations. The distribution of weights is also noticeably asymmetric-participants chose themselves (ws ϭ 1) on 36.1% of occasions, averaged on 17.5%, and chose the advisor (ws ϭ 0) on 10.0%. To test whether these three proportions differed from each other, we calculated the proportion of weights at each mode of the distribution separately for each participant. We tested all three pairwise comparisons using paired t tests on the arcsin-transformed proportions (Keppel & Wickens, 2004) at Bonferroni's ␣ ϭ .05/3 ϭ .016. All three pairs of proportions differed significantly, ws ϭ 1 vs. 0, t(75) ϭ 7.22, p Ͻ .001; ws ϭ 1 vs. .5, t(75) ϭ 3.28, p Ͻ .01; ws ϭ .5 vs. 0, t(75) ϭ 4.92, p Ͻ .001. The proportion of choosing trials (ws ϭ 1 or ws ϭ 0) was 46% in both the feedback and no-feedback conditions (t Ͻ 1, ns), indicating that participants did not choose more when they had more information.
We next examined whether the nature of the feedback affected how often participants used each mode of the distribution. The dependent variable is clearly non-normal; moreover, choosing and averaging appear to be psychologically discrete strategies rather than ends of a continuum. On the basis of these considerations, we treated the dependent variable as a multinomial response variable that on each judgment trial takes on one of seven ordered response categories, corresponding to the bins in the histograms depicted in Figure 4 (i.e., ws ϭ 0, . 01-.19, .2-.39, etc.) . The ordered logit model gives the odds, on an individual judgment trial, of ws being in a given category or above as a function of the independent variables.
3 These include a dummy for whether or not the participant received feedback and participant's own and advisor's pretest MAD scores in thousands of dollars (M ϭ 14.1, SD ϭ 5.2). Note that higher MAD scores indicate lower accuracy. As performance feedback is likely to have an effect only when it is available, we also included interaction terms between the feedback condition and the pretest scores. Because each participant contributed multiple observations that may have been correlated, we used the generalized estimating equations (GEE) approach to regression (Diggle, Liang, & Zeger, 1994) . The GEE method is highly flexible and can be used in conjunction with ordered logit. It provides robust standard errors to account for correlated observations, which are used to compute a Z statistic (Allison, 1999). 4 As expected, the ordered logit analysis revealed an Own Pretest ϫ Feedback interaction (Z ϭ 3.76, p Ͻ .001). This interaction, combined with the absence of a simple effect for own pretest in the no-feedback condition (Z Ͻ 1, ns), implies that own pretest influenced weighting only in the presence of feedback. Participants who received feedback on their own pretest were .89 times as likely to use a higher ws category as opposed to a lower one for every $1,000 increase in their own pretest MAD score (note that coefficients less than 1 imply a reduction in likelihood, so a reduction in one's accuracy leads to less weight on the self). For advisor's pretest, there was only a main effect (Z ϭ 2.82, p Ͻ .01). For every $1,000 increase in the advisor's pretest score, participants were 1.06 times as likely to use a higher ws category as opposed to a lower one. Although we did not obtain a Feedback ϫ Advisor Pretest interaction (Z ϭ 1.1, p Ͼ .2), the odds ratio for advisor's pretest was higher when participants received feedback compared with when they did not (1.08 vs. 1.03). The lack of an interaction implies that these two odds ratios did not differ signif- 3 The general form of the cumulative logit model is log
O ij refers to the odds for observation i that ws is in category j or above (starting with the second category of ws). The critical assumption in this model is that the coefficients b are constant across different splits of the dependent variable. As recommended by Allison (1999, p . 141), we examined the six possible binary logit models (e.g., category 1 vs. categories 2-7, categories 1-2 vs. categories 3-7, etc.) to determine whether the constant coefficient assumption is reasonable. An exponentiated coefficient gives the multiplicative effect that a one-unit change in the independent variable has on the odds ratio. Although we report these multiplicative effects in the text, they can be confusing because the same change in odds ratio can have very different effects in terms of probability. Thus, although cumulative logit allows us to distinguish which effects are statistically significant, we guide the reader to the figures to get an intuitive sense of how strategy use changes as a function of the independent variables. 4 In all of our experiments, we also conducted ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with weight on the self as the dependent variable and obtained similar patterns of coefficients and significance. This is despite the fact that OLS regression requires two assumptions that are violated in our data: normally distributed residuals and uncorrelated observations. These assumptions are not required by the analytic approach that we followed: ordered logit with GEE analysis. icantly. Finally, there was no main effect of condition (Z Ͻ 1, ns), indicating that participants were not more likely to use higher weight categories in one condition than in the other.
We conclude that participants were sensitive to both pretest scores when they received feedback, being more likely to choose one's own opinion when the feedback favored the self as opposed to the advisor. Participants were only sensitive to their own pretest when they were made aware of it, and the data are suggestive (though falling short of significance) of a similar pattern for advisor's feedback. To illustrate these effects, Figure 5 shows how often participants chose the self, averaged, and chose the advisor in the feedback condition as a function of the difference in pretest scores (no-feedback results are shown separately on the far right of the graph). We highlight three features of this graph. First, the rate of choosing and averaging combined (summing over the three lines) is roughly constant at 65% across the cue values depicted on the x-axis. Second, participants were sensitive to the cues-the more the pretest favored the self, the more participants chose the self and the less they chose the advisor. Third, all else being equal, participants favored their own opinions. For example, the graph shows that participants chose their own answer on about 45% of occasions when the cues strongly favored the self but only 30% of the time when the feedback strongly favored the advisor. Similarly, when the feedback strongly favored the advisor, they still chose their own answer about 20% of the time, but they almost never chose the advisor when they themselves were strongly favored.
Model fit. We next sought to assess the degree to which the PAR model accurately predicted the relative performance of averaging and choosing. With the accuracy ratio A and the bracketing rate Br as inputs, the model can be used to compute the ratio of the performance of a pure averaging strategy (averaging on every trial) to the performance of perfect choosing (choosing the judge with the lower MAD score with certainty). Recall that k is defined as the ratio of the MAD scores of averaging to choosing. We define k 1 to be the value of k when the more accurate judge can be identified with certainty, (i.e., p ϭ 1, and k 1 ϭ MAD averaging / MAD perfect choosing ). One way to think about k 1 is that it represents the distance between a specific environment and the iso-accuracy curve (see Figure 2) . The further k 1 is from 1, the more firmly the environment lies in the region that favors averaging when k 1 Ͻ 1 and choosing when k 1 Ͼ 1.
The fit of the PAR model can be assessed by comparing two versions of k 1 : a theoretical k 1 computed with the model using the observed values of A and Br as inputs and an empirical k 1 computed directly from participants' responses. To obtain a participant's theoretical k 1 , we first computed that participant's values of A and Br. We next used Equation 2 to translate Br into . Finally, we substituted the values of A and into Equation A6, set p ϭ 1, and then solved for k. For the empirical value of k 1 , we averaged the estimates of the participant and the advisor on each item, computed the absolute deviation from the truth, and then took the mean across items to obtain the MAD score for the averaging strategy. We then divided this by the MAD score of the more accurate judge to obtain the empirical k 1 .
A strong fit between the theoretical and empirical values of k 1 is not guaranteed. The model could perform poorly if participants' error distributions deviate substantially from normality or if bias is a large component of participants' MAD scores. In fact, the theoretical and empirical values of k 1 were highly correlated (r ϭ .89, p Ͻ .001), showing that the model accurately predicted the relative performance of pure averaging and perfect choosing.
Performance. We compared the MAD scores that participants' achieved through intuitive revision (i.e., their final intuitive estimates) with the performance of three benchmark strategies: random choosing, perfect choosing (choosing the one judge who was most accurate over all the questions), and pure averaging (averaging on every question). The expected performance of the random choosing strategy is simply the average of the two judges' MAD scores for the initial estimates (this is what participants could expect to achieve if they chose a judge at random). In most situations, perfect choosing is unattainable because the cues to expertise are imperfect. Still, the performance of perfect choosing is a useful reference, as it represents the maximum benefit to be had from acquiring better information about relative expertise.
We measured the effectiveness of a given strategy by the percentage improvement relative to the MAD score achieved by random choosing (greater percentage improvement indicated better performance). As shown in Table 1 , pure averaging outperformed both perfect choosing and intuitive revision in Experiment 1 (note that the values set in italics in the table provide means taken over all participants). The fact that pure averaging outperformed perfect choosing is consistent with what the PAR model would predict. The mean accuracy ratio and bracketing rate combination was (A, Br) ϭ (1.32, .38), which according to the PAR model, favors averaging even when the better judge is known for sure (see Figure 2) . Even if participants could always identify and choose the more accurate judge, they would have done better by averaging. The fact that participants often chose incorrectly hurt their performance even more.
The next analysis is more refined, taking into account the fact that each participant faced a different environment (characterized by A and Br) and used a different mix of strategies (participants chose and averaged to different degrees). We divided participants into groups that chose frequently (ws ϭ 0 or 1 on at least two thirds of judgments), chose occasionally (ws ϭ 0 or 1 between one third and two thirds of the time), and combined frequently (ws ϭ 0 or 1 less than one third of the time). As shown in Table 1 , all three groups would have improved by averaging. The combiners came closest, because this group of participants was already averaging on many of the questions.
Recall that the PAR model can be used to derive a theoretical value of k 1 , which is the predicted performance ratio of pure averaging to perfect choosing. Pure averaging is expected to be the better strategy when k 1 is less than 1, and perfect choosing is expected to be more effective when k 1 exceeds 1. Thus, we expected the frequent choosers to have achieved varying levels of success as a function of k 1 , which is a measure of how friendly the environment is to each of the benchmark strategies. To examine this, we regressed the improvement scores of pure averaging, perfect choosing, and intuitive revision against k 1theoretical . The best fitting curves are shown in Figure 6 . 5 The thick curves represent the performance of pure averaging and perfect choosing. As k 1 increased, pure averaging performed worse and perfect choosing performed better, as the PAR model predicts. The curves cross at k 1 ϭ 1, which indicates that the model accurately predicted the empirical crossover point at which the effectiveness of the two strategies reverses. Separate curves are shown in the figure for the frequent choosers and the combiners (the curve for the occasional choosers lies between the other two and is omitted for clarity). The frequent choosers improved as k 1 increased, following the trend of perfect choosing. However, the frequent choosers fell short of the performance of pure averaging at all levels of k 1 . The gap narrowed substantially for k 1 Ͼ 1 (when choosing has the potential to outperform pure averaging), but even here the frequent choosers would have been better off had they averaged. This is because they often chose the less accurate judge. As for the combiners, their performance closely tracked the pure averaging strategy. Their curve is slightly rotated relative to pure averaging because they did choose on a minority of questions.
Discussion
Contrary to the conclusions of past research, people do not typically adjust about 30% from their initial opinions. We also obtained the 30% value, but this is an aggregate effect that arises from a combination of often choosing oneself, occasionally choosing the advisor, and occasionally averaging. It is an interesting side note to consider that had participants consistently adjusted 30% toward advice, they would have come much closer to the performance of pure averaging as a result of the flat maximum principle.
Our data do not support a process of anchoring and adjustment. If people adjusted from an anchor, we would expect that some would adjust more and others less, and this would lead to a unimodal distribution around some mean level of adjustment. Instead, we observe a W-shaped distribution, which suggests that people primarily choose and average. The results do agree with past findings that people are biased toward their own initial opinions. Participants tended to choose themselves more frequently regardless of whether they received feedback, although they were sensitive to the direction of feedback when they received it. Even so, participants still chose the self more often than not, even when the feedback favored the advisor. There was no evidence that participants chose more when they had access to more information, as the percentage of choosing trials was about 46% in both the feedback and no-feedback conditions.
By and large, the choosing strategy did not serve participants well in this experiment. This result can be understood in terms of the PAR model. Dispersion in expertise was modest, with a mean accuracy ratio of about A ϭ 1.3. This implies that identifying the better judge was not sufficient to outperform a pure averaging strategy. Frequent choosers did perform better in high-k 1 environments, that is, those with relatively high A and low Br. However, the frequent choosers still fell short of averaging because they often chose the less accurate judge (in most cases, they chose themselves). In terms of the PAR model, poor ability to identify the better judge results in the iso-accuracy curve being rotated downward (see Figure 3) , substantially enlarging the region that favors averaging. Even choosing the judge who performed better on the pretest would not have helped-the pretest identified the better performer only 50% of the time in the feedback condition.
It could be that cues to expertise are more diagnostic at greater levels of dispersion. In that case, people might be able to take advantage of the cues to more frequently choose the better judge. We explored this possibility in Experiments 3 and 4. In Experiment 2, we examined whether the bias toward choosing oneself could be mitigated by providing a cue to expertise on individual items. In Experiment 1, participants only saw summary data on performance in a pretest. It could be that this feedback is too coarse, because it does not directly point to who might be more or less accurate on a particular question. People might choose the self less if they had access to a question-level cue to expertise.
Experiment 2
This experiment replicates Experiment 1, with the exception that in the current study, advisors rated their familiarity with each of the schools, and some advisors passed these ratings on to their advisee. Participants who have access to the familiarity of their advisor might choose the self less frequently, because they see that a good proportion of the time their advisor is more familiar with a school than they are. The remaining participants were in a control group that did not see the advisor's familiarity (they still rated their own familiarity, however).
Method
Materials. The materials were similar to those used in Experiment 1. A new set of 25 U.S. business schools was randomly selected from the Financial Times list. As before, mean 3rd-year salary served as the criterion.
Participants. Fifty-three University of Chicago MBA students participated. To highlight the fact that the advice was authentic, the experiment took place in a classroom so that answers could be collected and anonymously redistributed to others in the room.
Procedure. For each school, participants estimated the average 3rd-year salary and also rated their familiarity with the school on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (never heard of it) to 7 (extremely familiar). As in the first experiment, participants copied 5 The curves in Figure 6 were derived with OLS regression. In each regression, the dependent variable was ln(MAD strategy /MAD random ), which was regressed on k 1 (a quadratic term was also included when significant).
The predicted values were transformed to percentage improvement over random, as plotted in Figure 6 their answers onto an advice sheet, which was randomly and anonymously distributed to another student in the classroom. The 32 participants in the informed condition copied both estimates and familiarity ratings onto the advice sheet; similarly, they received an advice sheet with their advisor's familiarity ratings. In contrast, the 21 participants in the uninformed condition did not copy their familiarity ratings nor did they see the ratings of the advisor. Thus, the only cue available to participants in this condition was their own familiarity with each school. The payment scheme was the same as in Experiment 1, with payments ranging from $3 to $10 and a median payment of $7.40.
Results
Item-level weight analysis. We applied the same adjustment procedures as in Experiment 1, omitting 11.4% of observations on account of small differences and truncating 3.1%. Mean ws was .69, nearly identical to that of Experiment 1. We also observed the same W-shaped distribution of weights (Figure 4) . The three modes accounted for 66% of observations, indicating again that the mean weight was largely due to a combination of choosing and averaging. Participants chose the self on 38.8% of judgment trials, chose the advisor on 7.8% of trials, and averaged on 19.3%. The three proportions differ significantly from each other, as shown by paired t tests after applying an arcsin transformation (ts Ͼ 4, ps Ͻ .001). The proportion of choosing trials (ws ϭ 1 or ws ϭ 0) was similar in the two conditions (47% vs. 45% in informed and uninformed, t Ͻ 1, ns). As in Experiment 1, additional information did not change the rate of choosing.
We next examined whether the familiarity ratings (M ϭ 3.65, SD ϭ 0.68) influenced participants' usage of each mode. As in Experiment 1, we conducted an ordered logit analysis where the dependent variable is the weight category. The independent variables are a dummy for condition (1 if informed, 0 if not), participant's own rating of familiarity, and advisor's rating of familiarity. Models that included interaction terms between condition and familiarity ratings were also tested. Robust standard errors were used to account for correlated observations.
There was a main effect of participant's own familiarity rating (Z ϭ 2.43, p Ͻ .05). For every unit increase in participant's own familiarity with a school, participants were 1.14 times more likely Figure 6 . Performance of strategies relative to random choosing as a function of the environment, as measured by the model-derived theoretical value of k 1 . k values below 1 represent combinations of A, Br, and p that favor averaging; k values above 1 represent combinations that favor choosing. k 1 assumes p ϭ 1 (the more accurate judge can be identified with certainty). Regression lines for perfect choosing and averaging assume perfect applications of these strategies for all participants in each experiment. Regression lines for frequent choosers and combiners show the actual improvement for different subgroups of participants that most closely corresponded to choosing (frequent choosers) and averaging (combiners).
to use a higher weight category rather than a lower one. We also obtained an advisor's familiarity level by feedback condition interaction, such that the advisor's familiarity rating influenced weighting only in the informed condition (Z ϭ 4.36, p Ͻ .001). For every one unit increase in advisor's familiarity, participants were .78 times as likely to use a higher as opposed to a lower weight category when informed (i.e., they reduced weight on self as advisor familiarity increased). There was no main effect of condition (Z Ͻ 1, ns) and no simple effect of advisor's pretest in the uninformed condition (Z Ͻ 1, ns) . Model fit. To assess how well the PAR model predicted the relative accuracy of the pure averaging and perfect choosing strategies, we followed the procedure described in the Results section of Experiment 1. The theoretical and empirical values of k 1 correlated highly at r ϭ .90 ( p Ͻ .001). This shows that the model prediction of the relative performance of pure averaging and perfect choosing closely matched the actual ratio of the MAD scores of these two strategies. As shown in Figure 6 , the improvement curves for pure averaging and perfect choosing cross at model k 1 ϭ 1, which is the point at which the model predicts the two strategies will be equally accurate.
Performance. Overall, pure averaging proved once again to be the most effective strategy, outperforming both perfect choosing and intuitive revision. Pure averaging was also the best strategy for each of the three subgroups: frequent choosers, occasional choosers, and combiners (Table 1) . Combiners approached the performance of pure averaging, and frequent choosers underperformed both pure averaging and perfect choosing at all levels of k 1 ( Figure  6 ). According to the PAR model, frequent choosers could have done well in environments that potentially favored choosing (k 1 Ͼ 1), but they did not because they often chose incorrectly.
Discussion
Participants were sensitive to the available informationresponding to their own familiarity with a school and also to the advisor's familiarity when they were informed about it. As in Experiment 1, they tended to shift among choosing the advisor, averaging, and choosing the self, this time as a function of familiarity (see Figure 5 ). Providing the question-level familiarity cue did not lead participants to choose the self less frequently nor did it have an effect on the accuracy of the revised estimates. Thus, the bias toward one's own answers in Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to the coarseness of the feedback, as we replicated the result in Experiment 2 with an item-level cue. As in Experiment 1, the PAR model is helpful in understanding the performance results. The frequent choosers performed better in high-k 1 environments that favored perfect choosing. However, they fell short of both the perfect choosing and pure averaging strategies, because they often chose the less accurate judge.
Experiment 3
Participants' accuracy in the first two experiments fell short of the accuracy of a pure averaging strategy. However, in both experiments, the accuracy ratio was relatively low, such that most participants were operating in environments that favored averaging. We wanted to see how people would fare in environments with more dispersion in expertise. To do this, we paired participants who were from different countries on a quiz about countryrelated facts, with the idea that each person would be an expert on questions about his or her own country. We asked questions about both countries, with the expectation that participants would choose the self on questions about their own country and choose the advisor on questions about their partner's country.
Method
Participants and materials. Participants were 68 midcareer executives, most in their mid to late 30s and representing 24 nationalities, who were enrolled in an executive MBA program. The participants were paired such that each dyad member was from a different country. For each country, participants estimated (a) the percentage of the population living in an urban area, (b) the percentage of the population under 15 years of age, (c) the percentage of men that smoke, (d) the percentage of married women of childbearing age using a modern method of birth control, and (e) the percentage of members of parliament or congress who are women. Correct answers were obtained from the Web sites of the World Health Organization and the United Nations.
Procedure. Participants recorded estimates first for their own country and then for their partner's country. They then exchanged all 10 answers without discussing them and recorded final, private estimates. For each question, participants also assessed the probability that their answer was more accurate than that of their partner. The base payment was $1 per question, with 5¢ deducted for each percentage point that the final estimate deviated from the correct answer, up to a maximum deduction of $1. Payments ranged from $2.70 to $7, with a median of $5.
Results
Item-level weight analysis. Differences in estimates of less than five percentage points were treated as too small to compute meaningful weights. On this basis, 8.2% of observations were omitted from the weight analysis. An additional 3.7% of estimates were out of range, so ws was truncated to 0 or 1 (results are similar without making these adjustments). The mean ws was .59, somewhat lower than in the first two experiments. The overall distribution was W-shaped, although the distribution across the modes differed from the pattern of previous experiments (Figure 4) . Participants chose the self and averaged at about the same rateabout 25% at each mode, t(67) ϭ .75, ns, for arcsin transformed proportions-and chose the advisor 11% of the time, which differed from the other two modes (ts Ͼ 4.5, ps Ͻ .001). This pattern differs from the results of Experiments 1 and 2, in which participants chose the self at a higher rate, a point to which we return in the General Discussion. The three modes together comprised about 61% of observations, which is consistent with the results of the previous experiments.
Participants weighted their own opinions more highly on questions about their own country as opposed to questions about their peer's country (mean ws ϭ .75 versus .41), paired t(67) ϭ 11.36, p Ͻ .001. This discrepancy can be understood by examining the underlying pattern of weights. Participants chose the self much more often on questions about their own country and tended to average and choose their partner on questions about the partner's country (see Figure 7 ).
An ordered logit analysis provides additional insight into the determinants of ws. Robust standard errors were used to account for correlated observations. The independent variables were judged probability and a dummy variable for whether a question was about the participant's own or the partner's country. There was a main effect of country (Z ϭ 6.22, p Ͻ .001) such that participants were 3.44 times as likely to use a higher weight category for a question about their own country as opposed to their partner's country. Moreover, the effect of probability judgment (Z ϭ 4.84, p Ͻ .001) was qualified by a Country ϫ Probability interaction (Z ϭ 2.19, p Ͻ .05). The odds of using a higher as opposed to a lower weight category were 1.44 times higher for every 10-point increase in judged probability for partner's country and 1.80 times higher for own country. These results imply that the participants chose the self more frequently on questions about their own country even when judged probability of being more accurate was held constant. The interaction is shown graphically in Figure 8 . For each country, participants chose the self more and their partner less, the greater the judged probability. Averaging peaked at moderate levels of probability. Finally, participants were far more likely to choose the self for questions about their own country, especially when judged probability exceeded 75%.
Model fit. The PAR model accurately predicted the relative performance of the pure averaging and perfect choosing strategies. We followed the procedure described in the results section of Experiment 1 for comparing the theoretical and empirical values of k 1 . The correlation was r ϭ .93 ( p Ͻ .001), indicating a strong fit. In addition, the model correctly predicted the crossover point of the improvement scores of the two strategies at theoretical k 1 ϭ 1 (Figure 6 ).
Performance. Dispersion in expertise was substantially larger in Experiment 3 (mean A ϭ 1.77; see Table 1 ). Nevertheless, participants still would have been better off averaging. Notably, frequent choosers underperformed averaging across all levels of k 1 (Figure 6 ). Although accuracy ratios were high enough to justify choosing, the country cue turned out to be an ineffective cue to expertise. The dyad member from a given country was more accurate on questions about that country 50% of the time. Consequently, choosing was no more accurate than picking a judge at random.
An intriguing pattern of accuracy also emerged in this experiment. Although participants were initially more accurate with regard to their own country (MAD own ϭ 13.6, MAD partner's ϭ 14.4), their revisions were more accurate on the partner's country (MAD own ϭ 12.4, MAD partner's ϭ 11.8). This occurred because participants often averaged on questions involving their partner's country (achieving the benefits of averaging) and often chose the self for questions involving their own country. The fact that the country cue was invalid rendered the choosing strategy ineffective; hence, final estimates were more accurate on the partner's country.
One explanation for why some people choose frequently but inaccurately is that they are overconfident in their ability to identify the expert. The frequent choosers were, on average, 74% sure that they had identified the more accurate judge on individual questions, but they were correct in this regard only 50% of the time. This gap of 24% overconfidence can be compared with a gap of 17% for the occasional choosers (70% confidence vs. 53% accuracy) and 13% for the combiners (68% confidence vs. 55% accuracy). The more overconfident an individual is, the more often the individual identifies the inferior judge as more accurate. Therefore, we anticipated that more overconfident people would perform worse relative to pure averaging. To assess relative performance, we used the natural log of the ratio MAD revised /MAD averaging . The correlation between overconfidence and this relative performance measure was r ϭ .32 ( p Ͻ .01) for participant's own country and r ϭ .37 ( p Ͻ .01) for partner's country. The more overconfident the participants, the less accurate they were relative to pure averaging.
Discussion
In comparison with the first two experiments, Experiment 3 had greater dispersion in expertise (higher A in the PAR model). Consequently, perfect choosing outperformed a pure averaging strategy (Table 1 , Experiment 3). Nevertheless, participants failed to capitalize because they often chose the inferior judge. They often followed the country cue, which happened to have low validity. In Experiment 4, we sought to retain the high dispersion in expertise while at the same time improving the cues. The idea was to create the ideal situation for choosing.
Experiment 4
In this experiment, we used trivia questions drawn from five topics: air distances between U.S. cities, dates of events in U.S. history, ages of recent Oscar nominees, popularity ranks of pop singles, and number of wins of NBA basketball teams. We expected fairly wide variation in expertise on each of these topics. Moreover, we thought that participants would have a reasonably good sense of their expertise on these topics and that, therefore, a cue such as confidence might successfully distinguish better from worse judges. As in the first three studies, we included two conditions that differed in the amount of information about relative expertise. Participants in the informed condition rated confidence on each question and exchanged this information with their partner-advisor. Those in the uninformed condition rated confidence but did not pass this information along with their answers.
Method
Materials. For each topic, we randomly sampled 20 questions from authoritative sources (e.g., an almanac, Billboard's list of 50 top singles). Questions were divided into two booklets of 50 nonoverlapping questions, one topic per page. Each participant received one of the two booklets.
Participants. Seventy University of Chicago students participated in a laboratory experiment. They were solicited by advertisements posted on campus.
Procedure. Participants recorded their initial estimates for the 50 items as well as their confidence for each item on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely confident). They then copied their answers (and confidence ratings in the informed condition) onto an advice sheet, which went to another participant in the study with the same booklet. Participants received the advice sheet from the same person who received their advice. Dyads in the informed condition also met for 5 min to discuss their expertise on the five topics. Finally, all participants privately recorded final answers. They were instructed at the outset of the experiment about the entire procedure and were also told that they would be paid for the accuracy of their final answers. All participants received a $5 base payment. They also received 30¢ for each question, less 2¢ per unit deviation from the correct answer (per unit of percentage error for air distances). Negative payments were allowed for individual questions, but the minimum payment for each topic was zero. Total payment ranged from $5.90 to $14.80, with a median of $11.40.
Results
Item-level weight analysis. As in the previous experiments, the analysis of weights excluded items for which the difference in the initial estimates was very small (less than five units) on the relevant scale. Altogether, 14.8% of observations were omitted for small differences and an additional 4.6% were truncated for being out of range (results were qualitatively similar without making these adjustments). The mean ws of .63 is in line with the results of the previous experiments. As shown in Figure 4 , participants chose the self more than they averaged (39% vs. 17%), paired t(69) ϭ 6.17, p Ͻ .001 (calculated with arcsin-transformed proportions). Participants also chose the self more than they chose the advisor (39% vs. 13%), t(69) ϭ 8.08, p Ͻ .001. Rates of averaging and choosing advisor did not differ significantly (t Ͻ 1). Similar to the first three experiments, 69% of weights fell into the modal categories of a W-shaped distribution (see Figure 4) .
We also ran a logit analysis as in the previous experiments, with the ordered weight categories as the dependent variable. There was no effect of booklet (i.e., question set) or topic domain, so we dropped these from the model. There was no main effect of condition (Z ϭ 1.33, ns), that is, informed participants did not tend to use higher or lower weights than those who were uninformed. We did find a main effect of participant's own confidence (Z ϭ 6.22, p Ͻ .001), such that a one-unit increment in confidence corresponded to being 1.33 times more likely to use a higher as opposed to a lower weight category. The main effect of advisor confidence (Z ϭ 1.68, p Ͻ .1) was qualified by a Condition ϫ Advisor Confidence interaction (Z ϭ 3.22, p Ͻ .01). In the informed condition, each one-unit increase in advisor confidence corresponded to being .65 times as likely to use a higher as opposed to a lower weight category. This compares with a .91 odds ratio in the uninformed condition. As shown in Figure 5 , participants in the informed condition chose the self more and chose the advisor less as a function of the difference in confidence. Model fit. We followed the same procedure as in the previous experiments to assess model fit, described in detail in the Results section of Experiment 1. As in the first three experiments, the PAR model provided a good fit to the data. The model and empirical values of k 1 correlated at r ϭ .90 ( p Ͻ .001), and the improvement scores of the two strategies crossed near the theoretical value of k 1 ϭ 1 (Figure 6 ).
Performance. Differences in expertise were large-the mean value of A was 1.62. As shown in Table 1 , Experiment 4 was the only experiment in which intuitive revision outperformed pure averaging. In terms of the PAR model, we were successful in creating environments in which dispersion in expertise was high and in which participants reliably chose the better judge. Note, however, that this is an aggregate result. By examining the performance of individual dyads, we can gain a better sense of when and why intuitive revision performs well. As shown in Figure 6 , the frequent choosers closely tracked the performance of perfect choosing, a qualitatively different result from that observed in the first three experiments. As expected, the combiners performed about as well as those using the pure averaging strategy, because their weights approximated averaging on the majority of questions.
We can gain further insight into the performance of intuitive revision by examining the factors that led participants to choose more often and more successfully. We regressed proportion of choosing trials against the environmental variables of accuracy ratio (A) and bracketing rate (Br), a dummy variable for condition, and effects coding for the five topics (which allows a comparison of each topic with the average of all five topics). A hierarchical linear model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) was fit to account for the fact that there were predictors at both the participant level (condition) and the participant-topic level (accuracy ratio, bracketing rate, and topic). There was a significant random effect for the intercept at the participant level (Z ϭ 4.16, p Ͻ .001). This implies individual differences in the rate of choosing that cannot be accounted for by the independent variables. A fixed effect was found for the accuracy ratio, t(274) ϭ 2.18, p Ͻ .05. Participants chose more in response to greater differences in accuracy; to illustrate, participants chose on 64% of trials when A Ն 2, as compared with 54% when A Ͻ 2. The only other fixed effect was that participants chose less on geography questions (48% vs. the average 56% for all five topics), t(274) ϭ 3.03, p Ͻ .01. There was no fixed effect for bracketing, t(274) ϭ .92, p Ͼ .40, or for condition, t(68) ϭ 1.62, p Ͼ .10. Overall, the results show that participants partially adapted to the environment. They chose more the greater the difference in accuracy, which is one of the conditions that favors the choosing strategy. Participants did not appear to respond to bracketing. This is unsurprising because no obvious cues to bracketing were available. Finally, the lack of a condition effect replicates the finding in Experiments 1 and 2 that the amount of information did not influence the rate of choosing.
According to the PAR model, choosing is more accurate relative to a pure averaging strategy the greater the accuracy ratio A, all else being equal. As shown in Table 2 , more participants were classified as frequent choosers in the high-A environments: 57% (41 out of 72) of participant-topics were classified as frequent choosers when A Ն 2, as compared with 38% (106 out of 178) when A Ͻ 2. This greater choosing rate at high levels of A was accompanied by improved chances of choosing correctly (as determined by whether mean ws favored the more accurate judge). When A was low (Ͻ1.5) the frequent choosers chose correctly only 55% of the time. As A increased, this percentage increased to 82% at moderate levels of A (between 1.5 and 2) and to 95% at high levels of A (Ն2). These results indicate that participants chose more frequently and more successfully when, according to the PAR model, choosing was a more viable strategy.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 suggest a more optimistic story about people's ability to adapt. The PAR model states that choosing is more appropriate when dispersion in expertise is high (high A) and when the more accurate judge can be reliably identified (high p). Consistent with this, participants chose more often and more accurately at high levels of A. Adaptation was incomplete, however, as many participants would have been better off with pure averaging.
At first glance, the results of Experiment 4 appear qualitatively different from those of the previous experiments-at the aggregate level, intuitive revision outperformed pure averaging in this experiment (see Table 1 ). A closer look at the data, however, suggests that Experiment 4 was not as unique as it appears to be. Table  2 breaks down improvement as a function of A and the intuitive Note. Values set in italics represent means over all participants in that subgroup. Percentage improvement scores are defined as 1 Ϫ (MAD strategy )/ (mean of own and advisor's initial MADs), where MAD represents mean absolute deviation. The ns are counts of participant-topics (5 observations per participant). A ϭ accuracy ratio; Br ϭ bracketing rate. strategy applied. A was low for 60% (172 out of 350) of participant-topics, and in these instances participants underperformed pure averaging. In fact, the amount by which frequent choosers fell short of pure averaging in Experiment 4 is very close to the results of Experiment 1. An additional 19% (68 out of 350) of participant-topics had moderate values of A, and here too participants underperformed pure averaging, though by a smaller margin. The critical difference in Experiment 4 occurred for the 21% (72 out of 350) of observations with high A. On the basis of the PAR model, a choosing strategy can outperform pure averaging in these environments provided that the better judge can be reliably identified and the bracketing rate does not greatly exceed 50%. Participants in Experiment 4 chose more in the high-A environments, and for this subset of the data, intuitive revision outperformed pure averaging by a wide margin. The strong performance of intuitive revision in this experiment is due to what happened at high levels of A, which in the earlier experiments were either not represented (Experiments 1 and 2) or not accompanied by a high probability, p, of identifying the more expert judge (Experiment 3). What distinguished Experiment 4 from the first three experiments, then, was the presence of 21% of observations characterized by high A and high p. Why were these observations present in this experiment but not in the others? We suspect that it is because Experiment 4 used topics in which some people deliberately invest in expertise-topics such as sports, movies, and music. The fact that some people invest and others do not ensures high dispersion. Moreover, people know whether they have invested, which is a good cue to whether one is relatively more or less expert than others. In contrast, Experiments 1 and 2 used a topic familiar to all MBA students: business school salaries. This precluded high levels of A in those experiments. Experiment 3 used obscure questionsfew people deliberately study up on the smoking rates in different countries. The A ratios were high in Experiment 3, but the cues to expertise were poor. Only in Experiment 4 were the conditions in place for a subset of participants to outperform pure averaging. Note, however, that the subset is relatively small. When the 21% of observations with high A are removed, the remaining data look very much like those of the first two experiments. The results of Experiment 4 clarify the risks associated with averaging. If there are very large differences in accuracy and the better judge can be identified with high certainty, then choosing is the better strategy. When these conditions do not hold, then averaging is better, as was true for the majority of observations. An interesting secondary result in Experiment 4 is that people differed in strategy use beyond what could be explained by the environment. Although explaining individual differences is beyond the scope of the present article, this result suggests directions for future research. One possibility is that people are sensitive to their perceptions of the environment, which may correlate poorly with true differences in accuracy and bracketing rates. After accounting for differences in perceptions, the random effect for differences in the rate of choosing across individuals may disappear. Indeed, our own follow-up work suggests that perceptions of relative accuracy influence strategy choice; for example, people average more the less confident they are about who is more expert (Soll, Mannes, & Larrick, 2006) . Another possible source of individual difference is heterogeneity in lay theories. Although many people mistakenly think that averaging achieves average performance, a minority do have the correct intuitions Soll, 1999) , and these individuals do average more than others . Finally, personality variables (e.g., openness, need for closure) could potentially account for differences in strategy selection as well.
General Discussion
Past research concluded that people adjust 30% of the way toward advice. In contrast, our results show that people often choose or average. There is no contradiction, however. We replicated the mean level of 30% adjustment in our data but found that it was due to a combination of choosing and averaging. People primarily choose and average, and they are biased toward choosing themselves.
In the spirit of work on adaptive cognition (Gigerenzer, 2000; Payne et al., 1993) , people appear to have the right portfolio of strategies. This is a two-part argument. The first part builds on research on improper linear models. In many real-world situations, equal-weight averaging approaches the performance of regression weights and sometimes even outperforms it (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975) . If averaging is as good as regression, then surely it is as good as noisy and self-biased intuitive weighting, as our experiments demonstrate. The second part of the argument is that a choosing strategy such as take-the-best can be extremely effective in some situations (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006; Payne et al., 1988) . A judge who uses both strategies can perform extremely well if the right strategy is used at the right time. This is where people appear to be lacking. Our experiments also show that people often choose regardless of the environment and, for the most part, would be more accurate if they averaged more often. In our experiments, it was the high rate of choosing that led participants to underperform the pure averaging strategy.
Although we have emphasized the benefits of averaging in this article, we believe that choosing is a highly valuable strategy. As the PAR model specifies, two conditions must hold for choosing to outperform averaging. First, the environment must favor choosing, which happens when A is high (large difference in accuracy) and Br is low (little bracketing). Second, people must have access to valid cues to expertise, such that the probability of identifying the more expert judge ( p) is sufficiently high. In Experiments 1 and 2, the environment favored averaging, so the first condition was violated. In Experiment 3, the environment often favored choosing, but participants lacked good cues to expertise, violating the second condition. Only in Experiment 4 were both conditions satisfied, and even then only for a small subset of observations.
In sum, we have proposed a process in which people select between two strategies: choosing and averaging. Our data suggest that people are biased in at least two respects. First, they tend to choose in a broader range of environments than is desirable. In all but a handful of situations, participants in our experiments would have been more accurate had they averaged. Second, people are biased toward their own answers. This may involve choosing the self when the cues are equivocal or averaging when the cues favor the advisor (a bias that, ironically, may improve performance). The remainder of the General Discussion is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss factors likely to account for the tendencies to choose and to overweight the self. We then consider two alternative explanations to the proposal that people choose and average, anchoring and Bayesian reasoning, and conclude that neither can satisfactorily account for the data. We then turn to the PAR model and the environment, focusing especially on the factors that lead the environment to be friendly to choosing or averaging. Finally, on the basis of this research, we offer prescriptions for improving judgment.
Factors That Determine Weighting Strategies
In this section, we discuss factors likely to influence how often and whom people choose. We observed that the rate of choosing varied substantially across both experiments and individuals. The environment is a critical factor that underlies some of this variation. The experiment most favorable to choosing was Experiment 4 -it had the greatest dispersion in expertise (high A) and the most valid cues to expertise (high p). As evidence of adaptation, Experiment 4 also had the most frequent choosers, 42% of participants as compared with 20 -25% in Experiments 1-3. Moreover, within Experiment 4, the percentage of frequent choosers was highest for dyads with the highest dispersion in expertise (highest A). Participants did still often choose when averaging was the better strategy, so the adaptation was only partial.
A second factor likely to influence weighting is confidence. In Experiment 3, participants chose more when they were more confident, and overconfidence was associated with worse performance relative to averaging. One source of this overconfidence could be the tendency for people to perceive themselves as better than average. People might then discount an advisor if the advisor is perceived as closer to average (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Harvey & Harries, 2004) . One factor known to moderate the better-thanaverage effect is question difficulty. People tend to perceive themselves as above average on easy questions where everyone performs well and below average on difficult questions where everyone performs poorly (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Kruger, 1999; Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007; Moore, 2007) . Differences in question difficulty might account for some of the variation in the rate of choosing the self across experiments (Gino & Moore, 2007) . Participants chose the self most frequently in Experiments 1 and 2, which asked MBA students to estimate business school salaries. Most likely this was a familiar and easy topic for these participants, leading them to perceive themselves as above average and to choose the self. Analogously, the questions in Experiment 4 often pertained to less familiar topics and may have been perceived as more difficult, which could account for the higher rate of choosing the advisor in that experiment.
We also tried to manipulate confidence (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) by including a control group in which participants had access to fewer cues about the advisor. Normatively, additional valid information should tend to increase average confidence in identifying the expert, which should lead to more choosing. In each case we found that the rate of choosing was unrelated to the amount of information. It may be that one-sided information (e.g., participants' own confidence or feedback on their own performance) is sufficient to cause people to perceive large differences in expertise (Moore & Klein, 2008) . This is consistent with the above-cited result that people form impressions of relative standing on the basis of perceptions of question difficulty. These impressions are insufficiently regressive, so perceptions of one's relative standing are typically more extreme than is justified by the evidence (Burson et al., 2006; Krueger & Mueller, 2002) .
A third factor is egocentrism, which is likely to lead people to overweight themselves relative to others (Krueger, 2003; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) . At first glance, egocentrism may appear synonymous with the better-than-average effect. However, Experiment 3 provides a way of disambiguating the two. Participants in Experiment 3 chose themselves 60% of the time when they were highly confident that they were more accurate than their partner in responding to questions about their own country, but they chose their partner only 35% of the time when they were highly confident that the partner was more accurate on the partner's country. In other words, after controlling for confidence that the self is more accurate than the partner, participants chose more when they thought the self was more expert than when they thought the partner was more expert. This suggests an egocentric process in which people discount others simply because they are not the self.
Social norms are a fourth factor that may lead people to either average or choose. Harvey and Fischer (1997) suggested a norm to not ignore freely offered advice. Although we find much evidence of ignoring across the experiments, participants in Experiment 3 rarely ignored advice on their partner's country, irrespective of confidence (see Figure 8 ). By not choosing the self on the partner's country, participants may have conformed to a social norm that one should pay attention to the socially regarded expert (more likely to be the person actually from the country) despite being highly confident that they were more accurate than their partner.
Finally, individual differences represent a fifth factor that influences whether people choose or average. One source of difference is belief about averaging. In previous work, we showed that people who are better at extensional reasoning are more likely to understand error-canceling effects of averaging, and that this, in turn, is related to a greater tendency to average . Furthermore, in some cases people who incorrectly believe that averaging leads to average performance may nonetheless average because they are risk averse, wanting to lock in the average performance rather than gamble on a single judge. Additional individual differences that may be relevant include numeracy (Peters et al., 2006) , cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005) , and personality traits such as openness and need for closure.
People primarily do one of three things when revising their opinions: choose the self, choose the advisor, or average. However, the rate at which they do each of those things varies across experiments and participants. We have proposed five factors that are likely to affect the rate of using each of these three modes, encompassing the environment, confidence in identifying the expert, egocentrism, social norms, and individual differences. These factors can relate to one another in interesting ways. For example, people tend to be more confident (and justifiably so) in environments with greater dispersion in expertise. In addition, egocentric biases might be attenuated when there are strong social norms for compromise. Future research might investigate how these five factors (and others) interact to cause people to listen more or less to others when revising their opinions.
Alternative Explanations
We now consider two potential alternative explanations to our proposition that people choose and average. The first is anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . There are at least two distinct mechanisms that can produce anchoring effects-accessibility and insufficient adjustment-which appear to operate under different conditions (Epley & Gilovich, 2004) . The accessibility account applies when an external anchor is provided. For example, participants might first be asked whether a new Dodge Durango costs more or less than $10,000 and then be asked to estimate the price. An oft-replicated phenomenon is that people give lower estimates, the lower the starting anchor. This occurs even when the anchor is clearly generated in a random fashion, such as by using the last digits of a person's phone number (Russo & Shoemaker, 1989) . External anchors influence judgment by making anchor-consistent information more accessible. People seem to treat the anchor as an initial hypothesis and tend to selectively attend to and retrieve hypothesis-consistent information (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999) . In contrast, internal anchors appear to influence judgment not by accessibility but rather by a process of insufficient adjustment. For example, when asked for the freezing point of vodka, people automatically generate "32 degrees"-the freezing point of water-and then adjust downward (Epley & Gilovich, 2006) . Because this adjustment process is controlled and effortful, people adjust less when in a state of diminished resources or attention (Epley & Gilovich, 2006) .
The advice-taking paradigm appears to have elements of both internal and external anchors. The initial estimate is internal, which suggests an adjustment mechanism. The advisor's estimate is external and may lead to the automatic recruitment of adviceconsistent information. Regardless of which process fits best, an explanation based on either accessibility or adjustment would have to account for the trimodal distribution of weights. Taken alone, these processes seem to be consistent with a unimodal distribution of weights around .7, not the W-shape that we observed. Although the W-shape is not necessarily inconsistent with anchoring, it would require a modified view of how anchoring processes operate. It could be, for example, that people adjust away from initial opinions in a discontinuous fashion to form a W-shaped distribution. If this were true, it would imply some very specific processlevel effects. Full adjustment toward advice would require traveling through the partial adjustment stage and therefore would take longer. Future work should test whether this sort of multistep adjustment process underlies the phenomena of averaging and choosing.
A second alternative explanation is that people update their initial opinions as if they were rational Bayesians. As with anchoring, a Bayesian account would not invalidate choosing and averaging as descriptive phenomena. It would, however, provide an alternative explanation. Specifically, the Bayesian account would assume that people do not favor any particular weighting strategy but rather that beliefs about the environmental parameters happen to lead them to predominantly choose and average. To illustrate, we use Winkler's (1981) normal model for combining opinions. 6 Assume that the judges' point estimates x 1 and x 2 are the means of their subjective distributions. The mean of the updated distribution is then a linear combination of the judges' means, w 1 x 1 ϩ w 2 x 2 , where
and where i is the standard deviation of judge i's errors and is the correlation in errors. The weights sum to 1, so w 2 ϭ 1 -w 1 . The accuracy ratio would need to be greater than 4.4 to justify choosing (assuming that weights greater than .95 are rounded up to 1 so that the judge appears to be choosing). This far exceeds the typical values of A that we have observed empirically. It also substantially exceeds the accuracy ratios derived from the feedback that participants received in Experiment 1. In order to justify choosing in a Bayesian framework, participants in Experiment 1 would have had to either reject the feedback as grossly underestimating true differences in accuracy or to estimate bracketing to be much less than did the participants in Larrick and Soll (2006) . Although on the basis of this analysis, a Bayesian interpretation seems an unlikely candidate to explain the high rates of choosing, more research is needed to compare how intuitive weighting strategies relate to perceptions of the environment.
Modeling the Judgment Environment
We introduced the PAR model to describe the judgment environment. The model has three parameters that capture the probability of identifying the more accurate judge, the dispersion in expertise, and redundancy in judgments. Averaging performs better the greater the degree to which judges are similar in accuracy, the more they bracket the truth, and the more difficult it is to identify the better judge. These qualitative conclusions are likely to hold up to a wide range of assumptions. The specific model that we used (Equations 1 and 2) assumed normally distributed errors and no bias (relaxing this latter assumption has only a minor impact on the analysis, as shown in Appendix B). With these assumptions in place, the model performed well in two respects. First the empirically observed relative performance of averaging and perfect choosing (defined by the ratio of the MADs from using the two strategies) correlated well with the model predictions that were based on the observed parameters (the accuracy ratio A and the bracketing rate Br). This correlation between the model-derived theoretical value of k 1 and the empirically observed k 1 ranged between .89 and .93 across the four studies. Second, the model accurately predicted the crossover point at which perfect choosing surpasses the performance of pure averaging. Note that when the theoretical k 1 equals 1, the model predicts that averaging and perfect choosing will be equally accurate: Averaging should be more accurate when k 1 Ͻ 1, and perfect choosing should be more accurate when k 1 Ͼ 1. This was the case in all four studies (see Figure 6 ).
Origins of the Judgment Environment
We have shown in this article that the performance of strategies depends on the environment in which they are applied. Moreover, the performance of individuals depends on their ability to apply the right strategy at the right time, which hinges on the ability to accurately perceive the environment. In this section, we consider the factors that cause environments to differ as well as the factors that might influence perceptions. We organize our discussion around the parameters in the PAR model.
Probability and accuracy. Conditions that favor the development of expertise will tend to create dispersion in expertise. In such environments, choosing a single judge for advice (an expert over a novice) will be a more effective strategy than averaging opinions. What conditions yield stable differences in expertise? A large literature exists on the emergence of differences in expertise (e.g., Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Shanteau, 1992; Simon & Chase, 1973) . In some cases, established knowledge can be captured in rules and transmitted through extensive training (Nisbett, 1993) , such as professions (e.g., medicine, law, engineering, academic disciplines). In other cases, new expertise can be developed from experience as long as feedback is immediate and clear and causal relationships are stable (Fiedler, 2000; Hogarth, 2002) . Under these conditions, the resulting environment would be characterized by real and sustained differentiation in expertise (A is large) and valid cues for identifying experts ( p is large). This is the best case scenario for choosing and would allow choosing to consistently perform better than averaging.
What factors would create environments in which choosing is a less effective strategy than averaging? First, some environments may not permit the emergence of expertise (i.e., A is not very large). Examples include novel judgment problems, environments with unstable relationships, and environments with poor feedback (Camerer & Johnson, 1991; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978) . Feedback is poor if it is delayed, ambiguous, distorted by treatment, or missing (Hogarth, 2002) . For example, it may be hard to learn in a medical context because patient outcomes are either not tracked, difficult to categorize, or not known until long after treatment. Learning is also difficult in highly unpredictable environments, such as the stock market. Although professional money managers vary in their outcomes, many prominent scholars have argued that these differences are due largely to luck rather than skill (e.g., Malkiel, 2007) . There is the appearance of great dispersion in expertise, but this may be an illusion produced by the noisy feedback environment.
Second, even if expertise differences can arise, it does not guarantee the success of choosing as a strategy if cues to expertise are poor (low p). The validity of such cues hinges on the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of feedback on a judge's accuracy. With good feedback, one can see who is better than whom and by how much. In the absence of valid cues, people often rely on weak cues to expertise, such as confidence and eloquence (Littlepage, Schmidt, Whisler, & Frost, 1995) , and are overconfident in relying on those cues.
A third factor that favors averaging is selection. In some situations, differences in expertise will emerge ( p and A are large), but novices are selected (or self-selected) out of the population of judges that would be consulted for a problem. For example, contemporary meteorologists have such good prediction models that laypeople routinely defer to them as experts. The population of experts itself, however, is characterized by low expertise differences (low A) and few valid cues to distinguish among the experts (low p). In this selected population, an averaging strategy will be more effective than choosing (Hibon & Evgeniou, 2005) .
Redundancy. An important aspect of the aggregation environment is the degree to which judges' errors are redundant. All else being equal, redundancy increases the benefits of choosing relative to averaging (assuming that there is a difference in accuracy). What causes redundancy? We briefly review a variety of structural and social factors that induce shared error. First, people who have a shared background in terms of experience, training, or perspective will also tend to share bias and have correlated error (Page, 2007; Soll, 1999) . Second, interacting on a task leads to shared ideas and a shared judgmental policy (Brehmer, 1976; Stasson & Hawkes, 1995) . For example, the first speakers in a group establish a frame for subsequent judgments (Sherif, 1936) , and an early opinion can influence multiple generations of group members (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; Zucker, 1977) . Third, social structure determines whether individuals encounter similar information and, therefore, shared bias and correlated error. Burt (1992 Burt ( , 2004 has cogently argued that dense networks, characterized by high interconnectivity and multiple paths connecting any two actors, tend to produce high levels of redundancy in which actors circulate in a common pool of information. Judgments from multiple actors in a dense network are likely to be similarly biased, so the benefits of aggregation may be minimal. In sum, shared training, shared interaction, and shared network connections reduce bracketing and, all else being equal, give a stronger advantage for choosing over averaging. Do people accurately perceive the degree of redundancy in judgments? We believe this depends on the source of redundancy. Because people commonly interpret behavior or performance as reflecting characteristics of an individual (Ross & Nisbett, 1991) , the redundancy that emerges from shared individual traits is recognized, and people value collections of judges who vary in their traits. For example, people appreciate the benefits of drawing on judges with different experiences (Budescu, 2006; Gonzalez, 1994; Van Swol & Ludutsky, 2007) , different judgment styles (Goethals & Nelson, 1973) , and different biases (Soll, 1999) .
Other influences on redundancy, however, can be difficult to appreciate. For example, people do not adjust sufficiently for redundancy that arises from social interaction. As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider a study by Koehler and Beauregard (2006) in which participants were exposed to the judgments of others and then asked to reproduce what they would have said prior to exposure. Participants gave estimates very close to the judgments they saw-and, empirically, much closer than those they would have given if they had made truly independent judg-ments (which was demonstrated in a control condition). However, participants responded to the resulting closeness of judgments by increasing their confidence in the judgments-agreement in this case was interpreted as a cue to accuracy, not shared error. Thus, people failed to recognize that the judgments of others anchored their own answers through informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) .
Finally, one of the major sources of nonredundancy in judgment can be characterized as the absence of systematic commonalities in training or perspective. Consider two judges with no bias and with uncorrelated error. On average, they will bracket the truth 50% of the time. However, this form of nonredundancy is less salient because it is not linked to stable personal characteristics. The bracketing may be recognizable if one observes the pattern of judgments between the two judges over a period of time (e.g., 25% of the time Joe is high and Steve is low, and 25% of the time the reverse is the case). But feedback of this type is relatively rare in everyday life. Feedback on judge accuracy is often summary data about individual performance, making bracketing impossible to observe directly . In sum, people do value individual traits that produce nonredundancy in the form of opposing biases. However, people have poor intuitions about bracketing as a result of uncorrelated error , and we suspect that they often neglect social influence and structural factors that increase redundancy (such as anchoring on early, publicly stated opinions).
Improving Judgment
Given the range of judgment environments in the world and the potential inaccuracy in perceptions, what are the implications for when people should use averaging versus choosing strategies? There is a large body of evidence showing that averaging works well in a wide range of environments (Armstrong, 2001; Clemen, 1989; Clemen & Winkler, 1986) . However, some situations clearly favor choosing, such as when one expert is clearly better than others by a wide margin. Choosing is appropriate when one judge is substantially better than others and there is good feedback on expertise (Hogarth, 2002) . But often one or both of these conditions is in doubt. Is there a simple prescription for when to average and when to choose?
On the basis of the discussion above, we can offer two prescriptions. Both involve altering the environment so that aggregation strategies are more effective. These recommendations build on past research suggesting that it may be more advantageous to debias the environment than to debias the judge (Klayman & Brown, 1993) . The first suggestion is to make averaging as effective as possible. Figure 2 suggests how this might be done: Aim for an environment in the top left portion of the graph. Specifically, try to lower the accuracy ratio and increase bracketing without lowering average expertise. How would one go about this? Even when there is an obvious expert, it would be better to identify additional nonredundant judges of similar caliber and then average their judgments. In fact, at times it may even be worthwhile to seek out an inferior judge who is nonredundant (Hogarth, 1977) . To paraphrase Dawes and Corrigan (1974) , the whole trick is to decide who to ask and then to know how to average. Although we have focused on the case of two judges, it should be noted that each additional judge is valuable, albeit at a diminishing rate of return (Hogarth, 1978) . The recommendation to seek and combine the opinions of multiple judges (Surowiecki, 2004) stands in contrast to research that has focused on methods for groups to identify their best member (e.g., Bonner, 2004; Littlepage & Mueller, 1997) . Our analysis suggests that in many situations, aggregating nonredundant opinions of differing quality is a better tactic than relying on the opinion of a perceived best member.
Our second recommendation is to make choosing a more valid strategy by improving feedback on the performance of judges. It is obvious that one needs a track record of individual performances (compared to the truth) to learn the degree of dispersion and rank order of judges. Less obvious is the need for simultaneous judgments to learn the degree of redundancy across judges. This combination of feedback allows one to ask, is Judge A better than Judge B? By how much? And does Judge A tend to make errors similar to or different from Judge B's? With complete feedback on accuracy and redundancy, one can then choose and average very effectively. Of course, the amount of feedback required could be quite costly to gather. Moreover, many times this costly analysis will show that the aggregation environment is a low-dispersion (or low-redundancy) environment in which averaging is better anyway. This prescription, in fact, should be made contingent on a "value of information" calculation-if low dispersion or low redundancy is likely a priori, it may not be worth the investment-it will be more cost effective simply to average.
Improving Judgment in the Absence of Others
Averaging is a highly effective strategy, taking advantage of the common wisdom that two heads are better than one. But what if you have only one head? Several recent studies have shown that averaging estimates from the same person can improve judgment, although by not as much as averaging estimates from different people (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Soll, Larrick, & Zhu, 2006; Vul & Pashler, 2008; Winkler & Clemen, 2004 ). The PAR model suggests what to focus on to make the most of one head. First, the two estimates must tap into sufficiently different thought processes so that bracketing is greater than zero (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009) . Ideally, the judge will use different methods or take different perspectives so that the bracketing rate approaches the 30 -40% range that we have observed for two people. Bracketing is also likely to be greater when the judge is blind to his or her previous estimates on the same item. This can be done by introducing delay between estimates (Vul & Pashler, 2008) or by removing identifying features of the target (e.g., a radiologist can assess the same x-ray twice without knowledge of the patient's identity). Even with some bracketing, for averaging to be effective, one method cannot be clearly more accurate than the other-in other words, the accuracy ratio A should not be too high. In Vul and Pashler's (2008) study, averaging outperformed both guesses, even though the first guess was slightly more accurate than the second. Moreover, even if one estimate (the first or the second) were sufficiently more accurate, people would need to identify it. More research is needed, but our conjecture is that people are overconfident in identifying the single best method or perspective. This would favor averaging estimates from the same person rather than choosing the estimate perceived as best.
Concluding Comments
People must often reconcile their own opinion with that of another person. We have proposed averaging and choosing as two simple strategies that people may apply when confronted with social influence. These two strategies also happen to reflect the wisdom of two influential paradigms in judgment research. One paradigm studies judgment with linear models and concludes that unit weighting (i.e., equal weight averaging) of information is often highly effective (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975) . A second paradigm studies heuristics and advocates, according to some researchers, the choosing strategy of taking the best and discarding the rest (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999) . We developed the PAR model to show that the advice of both paradigms is valid depending on the characteristics of the environment. Moreover, we also presented empirical studies showing that people primarily choose and average when revising quantitative opinions. In this sense, people possess the right portfolio of strategies. However, it is not enough to have the right strategies; one must also know when to use them. It is here that people appear to fall short, often choosing when the environment indicates averaging.
The model that we introduced in this article, PAR, provides a lens on the environment of judges. The model describes the characteristics of situations that warrant one strategy or another for revising opinions. A challenge for future research is to describe environments that people typically encounter and perceptions of those environments. The choosing strategy is justified to the extent that the environment warrants it and perceptions of expertise are accurate. Averaging is powerful because in many cases, one or both of these conditions does not hold. Appendix B
Approximating the Bias Case Using Simulation
When judges are biased, it is no longer possible to derive a unique iso-accuracy curve for a given combination of A and Br. We show that the no-bias case reasonably approximates the location of the iso-accuracy curve when there is bias. The no-bias model does occasionally predict that averaging is more accurate than choosing when it is not and vice versa. However, we show that such errors are infrequent and tend to be relatively minor when they do occur.
To test the approximation, we systematically varied the values of the parameters for two judges. As shown in Equation A2, a key factor in determining performance is the bias-to-sigma ratio (B i / i , which reflects the amount of bias in judge i's estimates in relation to the standard deviation of the errors). It is therefore important that we cover a reasonable range of bias-to-sigma ratios in our test of the no-bias approximation. The ratio of the judges' sigmas should also cover a reasonably broad range.
To meet these requirements, we constructed a data set by varying the parameters as follows: Bias, Ϫ4 to 4 for one judge, 0 to 4 for the other judge, both in increments of 0.2 (because of the symmetry of the bivariate normal, it is unnecessary for both biases to range from -4 to 4); sigma, 1 to 4 in increments of 0.2 for both judges; and correlation, Ϫ0.7 to 0.7 in increments of 0.1. Using the formulas in Appendix B, A and Br were computed for each combination of underlying parameters, as were the expected MADs for averaging and choosing. The maximum bias-to-sigma ratio in the data set is four, which far exceeds empirically observed values.
For each observation in the simulation, we calculated k ϭ MAD averaging /MAD choosing . We compare k to a no-bias estimate (k nb ). To obtain this estimate, we first computed the correlation that would be needed to obtain that observation's level of bracketing, assuming that both biases are zero. Equation A6 is then used to obtain k nb , setting p ϭ 1 and solving for k.
In the full data set, k and k nb are similarly distributed (M ϭ .92 and .91, SD ϭ .36 and .38, respectively) and are highly correlated (r ϭ .990). The median absolute difference between k and k nb is .018, with an interquartile range of .006 to .047. An observation is misclassified if k and k nb have opposite implications for whether choosing or averaging is more accurate (i.e., k Ͻ 1 and k nb Ͼ 1, or k Ͼ 1 and k nb Ͻ 1). Altogether 3.03% of observations were misclassified. When they were misclassified, the absolute difference between k and k nb was typically small, with a median of .036 and an interquartile range of .020 to .064.
In our empirical studies, the bias-to-sigma ratio rarely exceeded 1.5. We therefore examined a restricted data set that includes only observations for which both judges had ratios no larger than 1.5. In this restricted data set, k nb approximates k even more closely. The correlation is slightly higher (r ϭ .994), the median absolute difference between k and k nb is smaller (median ϭ .011, interquartile range ϭ .002 to .027), and there are fewer misclassifications (1.97%). Moreover, when misclassifications do occur, they are relatively minor, with only a small advantage for either averaging or choosing (median absolute difference of .027, interquartile range ϭ .015 to .058).
Overall, these results show that k nb closely approximates the true value of k, and thus the no-bias model provides a reasonable approximation. If the actual value of k were used instead, the iso-accuracy curve (see Figure 2) would be perturbed slightly (and in slightly different ways depending on the bias-to-sigma ratios) but not enough to substantively impact our analysis or conclusions.
